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The Third Depression
By PAUL KRUGMAN
Published: June 27, 2010
Recessions are common; depressions are rare. As far as I can tell, there were only two eras in economic history that were widely described as “depressions” at the time: the years of deflation and instability that followed the Panic of 1873 and the years of mass unemployment that followed the financial crisis of 1929-31.
Neither the Long Depression of the 19th century nor the Great Depression of the 20th was an era of nonstop decline — on the contrary, both included periods when the economy grew. But these episodes of improvement were never enough to undo the damage from the initial slump, and were followed by relapses.
We are now, I fear, in the early stages of a third depression. It will probably look more like the Long Depression than the much more severe Great Depression. But the cost — to the world economy and, above all, to the millions of lives blighted by the absence of jobs — will nonetheless be immense.
And this third depression will be primarily a failure of policy. Around the world — most recently at last weekend’s deeply discouraging G-20 meeting — governments are obsessing about inflation when the real threat is deflation, preaching the need for belt-tightening when the real problem is inadequate spending.
In 2008 and 2009, it seemed as if we might have learned from history. Unlike their predecessors, who raised interest rates in the face of financial crisis, the current leaders of the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank slashed rates and moved to support credit markets. Unlike governments of the past, which tried to balance budgets in the face of a plunging economy, today’s governments allowed deficits to rise. And better policies helped the world avoid complete collapse: the recession brought on by the financial crisis arguably ended last summer.
But future historians will tell us that this wasn’t the end of the third depression, just as the business upturn that began in 1933 wasn’t the end of the Great Depression. After all, unemployment — especially long-term unemployment — remains at levels that would have been considered catastrophic not long ago, and shows no sign of coming down rapidly. And both the United States and Europe are well on their way toward Japan-style deflationary traps.
In the face of this grim picture, you might have expected policy makers to realize that they haven’t yet done enough to promote recovery. But no: over the last few months there has been a stunning resurgence of hard-money and balanced-budget orthodoxy.
As far as rhetoric is concerned, the revival of the old-time religion is most evident in Europe, where officials seem to be getting their talking points from the collected speeches of Herbert Hoover, up to and including the claim that raising taxes and cutting spending will actually expand the economy, by improving business confidence. As a practical matter, however, America isn’t doing much better. The Fed seems aware of the deflationary risks — but what it proposes to do about these risks is, well, nothing. The Obama administration understands the dangers of premature fiscal austerity — but because Republicans and conservative Democrats in Congress won’t authorize additional aid to state governments, that austerity is coming anyway, in the form of budget cuts at the state and local levels.
Why the wrong turn in policy? The hard-liners often invoke the troubles facing Greece and other nations around the edges of Europe to justify their actions. And it’s true that bond investors have turned on governments with intractable deficits. But there is no evidence that short-run fiscal austerity in the face of a depressed economy reassures investors. On the contrary: Greece has agreed to harsh austerity, only to find its risk spreads growing ever wider; Ireland has imposed savage cuts in public spending, only to be treated by the markets as a worse risk than Spain, which has been far more reluctant to take the hard-liners’ medicine.
It’s almost as if the financial markets understand what policy makers seemingly don’t: that while long-term fiscal responsibility is important, slashing spending in the midst of a depression, which deepens that depression and paves the way for deflation, is actually self-defeating.
So I don’t think this is really about Greece, or indeed about any realistic appreciation of the tradeoffs between deficits and jobs. It is, instead, the victory of an orthodoxy that has little to do with rational analysis, whose main tenet is that imposing suffering on other people is how you show leadership in tough times.
And who will pay the price for this triumph of orthodoxy? The answer is, tens of millions of unemployed workers, many of whom will go jobless for years, and some of whom will never work again.
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Monday, June 28, 2010
Wednesday, June 09, 2010
China's labour squeezing business model - how long can it last?
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Dismantling Factories in a Dreamweaver Nation
by Andy Xie
A new generation is challenging China's labor-squeezing business model and an older generation that apparently doesn't get it
A decade ago, I took a group of fund managers to an assembly line at an electronics manufacturing contractor in China. We saw rows and rows of young women hunkered down, concentrating on putting together tiny parts. They had few toilet breaks, and during rest periods they had to sit at their benches.
"They're all 18," the line manager told me. "We need nimble fingers. In a few years, we will replace them with another batch of 18-year-olds."
I wrote a story after that visit. I didn't judge the situation but stated that a compliant labor force willing to be pushed to the extreme was the fuel for China's economic miracle. The engine was the mutually beneficial relationship between western companies with technologies, brands and distribution channels, and China-based manufacturing outsourcing companies that specialized in taking advantage of China's vast, cheap labor force. These included Taiwanese companies, which have been by far the most successful in the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) business.
The fund managers with me on the visit wanted to determine sustainability and profitability before deciding whether to buy the company's shares. They thought an endless supply of labor would ensure the model's profitability, and they were bullish about the company. What's happened in the years since has proven them right.
But will they be right indefinitely? To answer that question, we can glance back to the days of silent film star Charlie Chaplin. In his movies, Chaplin parodied the inhumane nature of the modern factory system, especially monotonous human movement on assembly lines. What he portrayed vanished a long time ago in developed countries, driven out by rising labor costs. Factory owners invested in automation, such as robots that now dominate modern auto assembly plants.
When multinational companies outsourced production to China, though, their business became less capital intensive. They took advantage of low labor costs and abundant supply. Some businesses, such as battery makers, started substituting machines with people. But no one could have predicted how far the outsourcing model, particularly in the electronics sector, would go while companies scaled up and maximized economies of scale by using cheap labor.
Scaling Higher
Economies of scale are typically associated with capital intensive industries. When a business requires a lump-sum fixed investment, it requires a certain scale to make the investment pay. Outsourcing businesses in China are labor intensive but have scaled up massively. Some businesses employ hundreds of thousands, often at a single location. So where do they get the economies of scale?
I know of two factors that can be scaled up in such businesses: customer relations, and what I call labor squeeze.
Good relations with big buyers such as Apple and HP are not easily obtained. Years of interaction are needed to build necessary trust. Suppliers that prove better than others are retained, while the rest are dumped. As time goes by, the number of suppliers shrinks and the survivors expand.
Thus, economies of scale are improved through good management of customer relations. Apple, for example, demands total secrecy in the production of its products. This goal cannot be met if it uses many suppliers, so when it signs with a trustworthy supplier a virtuous cycle is created.
An even more important factor is labor management. What I observed during my visit 10 years ago was actually the key to economies of scale. To put it bluntly, the key competence of a successful OEM in China is to squeeze labor to the maximum extent possible. That skill is developed within an organization. When a company employs hundreds of thousands from all over China, it needs a massive machine that involves recruiting, housing, training, and worker management on the factory floor.
For example, the factory I visited derives its economies of scale from 1) knowing where to find all the 18-year-old girls, 2) convincing them to stay in factory dormitories, 3) training them to put the parts together, and 4) ensuring that no one takes too many toilet breaks. This is all part of a huge system that can derive considerable economies of scale by processing hundreds of thousands of workers.
Labor management as a core competitive advantage in East Asia began in Japan. After the Meiji Reforms, Japan wanted to industrialize quickly but faced the challenge of turning agricultural labor into industrial labor. It looked to the military for a role model. The military faced a similar challenge: It had to turn farm boys into soldiers. The answer was maximum pressure and total regimentation. Factory uniforms, morning exercises, company loyalty indoctrination, etc., thus became unique characteristics of Japanese factories.
This model becomes less relevant as the transition from rural to urban labor force winds down and labor costs rise. Nowadays, Japanese factories have few workers and lots of robots on factory floors.
The Japanese military factory management system spread to other parts of East Asia, especially Taiwan. It was a Japanese colony for a half-century and receptive to Japanese management skills. When the yen's value rose in the 1970s, Taiwan got its first opportunity to take away Japanese market share by adopting the Japanese factory management system.
And when the Taiwanese took their businesses to the mainland, they found a place for applying their skill with 50 times as many people. Because they combine the Japanese system and knowledge of China's labor force, they are better than Japanese in managing factories in China.
The magnitude of scaling up by Taiwanese businesses is beyond what the Japanese could have imagined. Indeed, no other businesses have done what Taiwanese businessmen have with hundreds of thousands of workers in labor intensive operations.
This Taiwanese success drove an economic restructuring in the United States. It allowed multinational companies to focus on research and development, branding and distribution. Today, a U.S. brand company can dream up a product and order it from a Taiwanese company with factories in China as easily as ordering a pizza from Pizza Hut. Without Taiwanese factories in China, it is hard to believe that Wal-Mart and Apple, the era's quintessential creatures, could have become as successful as they are.
This sustainability of this profitable relationship between U.S. brand and distribution companies and Taiwanese factories is based on a Chinese labor force that continues to be plentiful and willing to accept working conditions.
How Much Longer?
In early 1990s, when I was working in Latin America, I became bullish on China's future. I saw Chinese workers would go much farther than elsewhere to earn a little money for two reasons: a cultural acceptance of "eating bitterness" in life; and familial obligations.
The girls at the factory I visited were earning US$ 100 a month, which was not a bad wage. That money could be used to pay for a younger brother's tuition, a mother's medical bill and, if circumstance permitted, building a house for the whole family. Each worker was willing to sacrifice herself for the family; she was not living for herself. Essentially, she accepted hardship.
These factors have changed. Today's young adults are less willing to eat bitterness. They are the first generation to grow up during prosperity, without worrying about food and shelter. Many were pampered by parents sensitive to the one-child policy. They are more like counterparts in other countries, which is good for China's international relations.
Moreover, rural families are not desperate as they were a decade ago. Siblings are few, and the government pays much more for rural education. Health insurance is decreasing the numbers of families facing financial crises due to sickness. Most rural families have built houses. And familial obligations for today's rural youth are not as urgent as in the past.
Meanwhile, inflation has severely eroded income value. Today's rural youth aspire to live in big cities, yet property prices in cities have grown twice as fast as wages. Dreams of owning a house in a comfortable city are becoming more distant.
Recent events at Foxconn and Honda factories are symbols of this new China. The labor force isn't as plentiful or compliant as before, and the ways that governments and businesses are handling the situations expose their ignorance of a new reality. They still think these are isolated incidents and, through pressure and bribery (such as a little wage increase for all and then firing rebel leaders) can bring the situation back to normal.
They think this way because of a generation gap, and the unusual relationship between local governments and businesses in China. The economy has raced three times faster than western economies did a century ago, and the generation gap seems three times larger as well. Today's young adults and their parents may as well be from different centuries. But government and business leaders are all from the parental generation, handling labor crises from this old perspective.
The governing class judges everything on short-term, marginal economic improvement rather than according to dreams and long-term goals. Today's young people are more concerned about what will happen to them in the future. They want to settle down in big cities and have interesting, well-paying jobs – just like their counterparts in other countries. This vast generation gap in perception is the force behind social tension over China's property bubble as well as factory working conditions.
The current factory system is unable to realize the dreams of today's young people. China's factories are often in isolated locations and self-contained. Youths who leave villages for these jobs find themselves more isolated than at home, with little hope of integration into urban communities. Indeed, they are neither in city or village. It's the most isolated life possible.
The compensation system makes their lives extremely difficult as well. Base pay is low, and only with massive overtime can they expect close to 2,000 yuan a month. They have no time for self improvement or integrating into modern urban life. In a few years, they will lose their youth and jobs, but they still will not have the ability or financial resources to live in cities.
Business leaders and government officials, of course, are asking why these workers aren't willing to accept these conditions, like the workers of a decade ago. They grew up in poverty and rule the country with a view that marginal economic improvement is the purpose of life. They don't appreciate, however, that times have changed: The previous generation focused on economic benefits for relatives in villages, not their own futures.
The unusual relationship between factory owners and local governments makes it difficult to resolve or prevent labor problems. Most coastal factories have workers from interior provinces. The governments have few ties to workers, but they are very connected to factory owners through tax revenues and other benefits. Local governments, therefore, side with the businesses when dealing with workers.
To improve the situation, the central government should limit these major, isolated factory sites. In the future, they should be located close to cities. As in other countries, workers should be encouraged to rent housing rather than live in factory dormitories. They should have a chance to integrate into urban life.
For example, future factories should locate close to provincial capitals such as Changsha, Chengdu, Hefei and Nanchang, which until now have been supplying workers for coastal regions. As a general rule, these cities should discourage factory dormitories but instead build public transportation systems to link factories and residential areas.
For many, these sorts of solutions to China's labor challenges may be apparent. But government and business leaders may not understand them at all. They are blinded by the urge to continue operating within the confines of the old model while protecting businesses from potential buyers in the West. So, when dealing with crises such as those at Foxconn and Honda, they try temporary fixes.
I'm afraid similar yet greater problems will eventually surface. Ultimately, market force will bring down the current system. Workers don't have to show up for factory jobs. They can join the urban service sector instead, where wages may be a bit lower but lifestyles are much better, and have a chance to integrate into urban life.
Rising labor costs will ultimately force factories closer to labor sources, and working conditions will turn more humane. The biggest losers will be coastal governments that side with the factories to protect their revenues. If they refuse to change, they will lose the factories and all those nimble fingers.
Dismantling Factories in a Dreamweaver Nation
by Andy Xie
A new generation is challenging China's labor-squeezing business model and an older generation that apparently doesn't get it
A decade ago, I took a group of fund managers to an assembly line at an electronics manufacturing contractor in China. We saw rows and rows of young women hunkered down, concentrating on putting together tiny parts. They had few toilet breaks, and during rest periods they had to sit at their benches.
"They're all 18," the line manager told me. "We need nimble fingers. In a few years, we will replace them with another batch of 18-year-olds."
I wrote a story after that visit. I didn't judge the situation but stated that a compliant labor force willing to be pushed to the extreme was the fuel for China's economic miracle. The engine was the mutually beneficial relationship between western companies with technologies, brands and distribution channels, and China-based manufacturing outsourcing companies that specialized in taking advantage of China's vast, cheap labor force. These included Taiwanese companies, which have been by far the most successful in the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) business.
The fund managers with me on the visit wanted to determine sustainability and profitability before deciding whether to buy the company's shares. They thought an endless supply of labor would ensure the model's profitability, and they were bullish about the company. What's happened in the years since has proven them right.
But will they be right indefinitely? To answer that question, we can glance back to the days of silent film star Charlie Chaplin. In his movies, Chaplin parodied the inhumane nature of the modern factory system, especially monotonous human movement on assembly lines. What he portrayed vanished a long time ago in developed countries, driven out by rising labor costs. Factory owners invested in automation, such as robots that now dominate modern auto assembly plants.
When multinational companies outsourced production to China, though, their business became less capital intensive. They took advantage of low labor costs and abundant supply. Some businesses, such as battery makers, started substituting machines with people. But no one could have predicted how far the outsourcing model, particularly in the electronics sector, would go while companies scaled up and maximized economies of scale by using cheap labor.
Scaling Higher
Economies of scale are typically associated with capital intensive industries. When a business requires a lump-sum fixed investment, it requires a certain scale to make the investment pay. Outsourcing businesses in China are labor intensive but have scaled up massively. Some businesses employ hundreds of thousands, often at a single location. So where do they get the economies of scale?
I know of two factors that can be scaled up in such businesses: customer relations, and what I call labor squeeze.
Good relations with big buyers such as Apple and HP are not easily obtained. Years of interaction are needed to build necessary trust. Suppliers that prove better than others are retained, while the rest are dumped. As time goes by, the number of suppliers shrinks and the survivors expand.
Thus, economies of scale are improved through good management of customer relations. Apple, for example, demands total secrecy in the production of its products. This goal cannot be met if it uses many suppliers, so when it signs with a trustworthy supplier a virtuous cycle is created.
An even more important factor is labor management. What I observed during my visit 10 years ago was actually the key to economies of scale. To put it bluntly, the key competence of a successful OEM in China is to squeeze labor to the maximum extent possible. That skill is developed within an organization. When a company employs hundreds of thousands from all over China, it needs a massive machine that involves recruiting, housing, training, and worker management on the factory floor.
For example, the factory I visited derives its economies of scale from 1) knowing where to find all the 18-year-old girls, 2) convincing them to stay in factory dormitories, 3) training them to put the parts together, and 4) ensuring that no one takes too many toilet breaks. This is all part of a huge system that can derive considerable economies of scale by processing hundreds of thousands of workers.
Labor management as a core competitive advantage in East Asia began in Japan. After the Meiji Reforms, Japan wanted to industrialize quickly but faced the challenge of turning agricultural labor into industrial labor. It looked to the military for a role model. The military faced a similar challenge: It had to turn farm boys into soldiers. The answer was maximum pressure and total regimentation. Factory uniforms, morning exercises, company loyalty indoctrination, etc., thus became unique characteristics of Japanese factories.
This model becomes less relevant as the transition from rural to urban labor force winds down and labor costs rise. Nowadays, Japanese factories have few workers and lots of robots on factory floors.
The Japanese military factory management system spread to other parts of East Asia, especially Taiwan. It was a Japanese colony for a half-century and receptive to Japanese management skills. When the yen's value rose in the 1970s, Taiwan got its first opportunity to take away Japanese market share by adopting the Japanese factory management system.
And when the Taiwanese took their businesses to the mainland, they found a place for applying their skill with 50 times as many people. Because they combine the Japanese system and knowledge of China's labor force, they are better than Japanese in managing factories in China.
The magnitude of scaling up by Taiwanese businesses is beyond what the Japanese could have imagined. Indeed, no other businesses have done what Taiwanese businessmen have with hundreds of thousands of workers in labor intensive operations.
This Taiwanese success drove an economic restructuring in the United States. It allowed multinational companies to focus on research and development, branding and distribution. Today, a U.S. brand company can dream up a product and order it from a Taiwanese company with factories in China as easily as ordering a pizza from Pizza Hut. Without Taiwanese factories in China, it is hard to believe that Wal-Mart and Apple, the era's quintessential creatures, could have become as successful as they are.
This sustainability of this profitable relationship between U.S. brand and distribution companies and Taiwanese factories is based on a Chinese labor force that continues to be plentiful and willing to accept working conditions.
How Much Longer?
In early 1990s, when I was working in Latin America, I became bullish on China's future. I saw Chinese workers would go much farther than elsewhere to earn a little money for two reasons: a cultural acceptance of "eating bitterness" in life; and familial obligations.
The girls at the factory I visited were earning US$ 100 a month, which was not a bad wage. That money could be used to pay for a younger brother's tuition, a mother's medical bill and, if circumstance permitted, building a house for the whole family. Each worker was willing to sacrifice herself for the family; she was not living for herself. Essentially, she accepted hardship.
These factors have changed. Today's young adults are less willing to eat bitterness. They are the first generation to grow up during prosperity, without worrying about food and shelter. Many were pampered by parents sensitive to the one-child policy. They are more like counterparts in other countries, which is good for China's international relations.
Moreover, rural families are not desperate as they were a decade ago. Siblings are few, and the government pays much more for rural education. Health insurance is decreasing the numbers of families facing financial crises due to sickness. Most rural families have built houses. And familial obligations for today's rural youth are not as urgent as in the past.
Meanwhile, inflation has severely eroded income value. Today's rural youth aspire to live in big cities, yet property prices in cities have grown twice as fast as wages. Dreams of owning a house in a comfortable city are becoming more distant.
Recent events at Foxconn and Honda factories are symbols of this new China. The labor force isn't as plentiful or compliant as before, and the ways that governments and businesses are handling the situations expose their ignorance of a new reality. They still think these are isolated incidents and, through pressure and bribery (such as a little wage increase for all and then firing rebel leaders) can bring the situation back to normal.
They think this way because of a generation gap, and the unusual relationship between local governments and businesses in China. The economy has raced three times faster than western economies did a century ago, and the generation gap seems three times larger as well. Today's young adults and their parents may as well be from different centuries. But government and business leaders are all from the parental generation, handling labor crises from this old perspective.
The governing class judges everything on short-term, marginal economic improvement rather than according to dreams and long-term goals. Today's young people are more concerned about what will happen to them in the future. They want to settle down in big cities and have interesting, well-paying jobs – just like their counterparts in other countries. This vast generation gap in perception is the force behind social tension over China's property bubble as well as factory working conditions.
The current factory system is unable to realize the dreams of today's young people. China's factories are often in isolated locations and self-contained. Youths who leave villages for these jobs find themselves more isolated than at home, with little hope of integration into urban communities. Indeed, they are neither in city or village. It's the most isolated life possible.
The compensation system makes their lives extremely difficult as well. Base pay is low, and only with massive overtime can they expect close to 2,000 yuan a month. They have no time for self improvement or integrating into modern urban life. In a few years, they will lose their youth and jobs, but they still will not have the ability or financial resources to live in cities.
Business leaders and government officials, of course, are asking why these workers aren't willing to accept these conditions, like the workers of a decade ago. They grew up in poverty and rule the country with a view that marginal economic improvement is the purpose of life. They don't appreciate, however, that times have changed: The previous generation focused on economic benefits for relatives in villages, not their own futures.
The unusual relationship between factory owners and local governments makes it difficult to resolve or prevent labor problems. Most coastal factories have workers from interior provinces. The governments have few ties to workers, but they are very connected to factory owners through tax revenues and other benefits. Local governments, therefore, side with the businesses when dealing with workers.
To improve the situation, the central government should limit these major, isolated factory sites. In the future, they should be located close to cities. As in other countries, workers should be encouraged to rent housing rather than live in factory dormitories. They should have a chance to integrate into urban life.
For example, future factories should locate close to provincial capitals such as Changsha, Chengdu, Hefei and Nanchang, which until now have been supplying workers for coastal regions. As a general rule, these cities should discourage factory dormitories but instead build public transportation systems to link factories and residential areas.
For many, these sorts of solutions to China's labor challenges may be apparent. But government and business leaders may not understand them at all. They are blinded by the urge to continue operating within the confines of the old model while protecting businesses from potential buyers in the West. So, when dealing with crises such as those at Foxconn and Honda, they try temporary fixes.
I'm afraid similar yet greater problems will eventually surface. Ultimately, market force will bring down the current system. Workers don't have to show up for factory jobs. They can join the urban service sector instead, where wages may be a bit lower but lifestyles are much better, and have a chance to integrate into urban life.
Rising labor costs will ultimately force factories closer to labor sources, and working conditions will turn more humane. The biggest losers will be coastal governments that side with the factories to protect their revenues. If they refuse to change, they will lose the factories and all those nimble fingers.
Tuesday, May 18, 2010
Moving backwards 20 years!
I was chatting with two friends, A and B, on the msn. The topic strayed towards the ever declining service standards in Spore...
what can i say except.... Thank you PAP! hahaha!
.
A: actually it all comes down to the service
A: how they present themselves
B: i know the local staff got problem with the PRC workers
B: that day i saw one ask a prc staff to go photostat something, the fella go come back say cannot find, all kind of excuses
B: these PRC really fucked up, chao keng to the max
A: that is the side effect of singapore importing all the prc
A: we are moving backwards 20 years in terms of service
B: they r just fucking lazy
A: these days very obvious in retail and F&B
B: my place now some cleaning staff from china... same, always hide somewhere talk on their mobile
A: singapore service is totally fuck up
B: the malays are better
A: u compare with HK
A: HK u remember in the 80's has a bad name in service but they have caught up in the last 10 years
B: my friends say HK is ahead of SG many yrs ago liao
A: today Hk service is FUCKING EXCELLENT
B: chee bye PAP (haha i LOL at this)
A: thailand is also better than us
A: but what really surprised me was taiwan
A: when i went taipei a few years ago, their service also much better than us
A: and the locals are more orderly,
B: taiwan all the while is better lah
A: in every other asian country, the locals bother to stand one side when on the escalator
A: singapore is the only fucking country where local hog and block the escalator
what can i say except.... Thank you PAP! hahaha!
.
Thursday, May 13, 2010
Increase the Weight-age, not reduce!
A response i posted in Yawning bread's blog on the Mother Tongue issue.
Also posted another reply in TKL's blog... hahaha.
have u heard japanese speak english? have u heard our foreign talent scholarship holders from china etc speak english? hahaha!
yet u hv these ppl having no problem getting admission into local uni. is fluency a big criteria? (ok i admit uni admission is more the fucked up garment's FT policy, still the point on fluency stands.)
so why when it comes to Sgians this obsession with fluency?
the key is literacy.
and really u can dig up all the pseudo-psycho-neuro-empirical justifications possible and there will still be no conclusion and end to this. Becos the fact is MOST people have no problem mastering or passing two languages. (i mean it is unlikely to claim someone is a strong student etc if he/she cannot even pass 2nd lang after putting in effort lol)
the education system at primary school level certainly needs to be looked at, but IMO it is the REVERSE that should be done. INCREASE weightage on 1st and 2nd language weightage, reduce weightage on maths, science, etc! Increase weightage will drive greater emphasis on the soft subjects like languages, this is crucial becos it is the soft subjects that are the primary foundations for the eventual development and prowess in hard subjects like science and maths later on. And these foundations need to be strengthened at the pri school level and not later.
Also posted another reply in TKL's blog... hahaha.
i am surprised that the PAP gabrament has allowed the 2nd Lang issue to degenerate to such a state.
the MOE is also showing a profound lack of basic understanding what primary sch education should be all about. Too many yes-men who cannot think critically?
Pri sch level is when u build foundations, foundations that are the building blocks to hard subjects like sciences and maths later on. And the most basic foundations of all are language skills. Strong lang skills (soft subjects) make the subsequent learning of hard subjects like science and maths much easier in sec sch level and beyond. That is what education has always been about.
So instead of reducing weightage in 2nd Lang etc. I say INCREASE the weightage of the two languages at pri sch level! This move will straight away divert more real resources into the teaching and learning of language skills instead of token lip service by the PM and the clueless edu minister.
NNB so simple also don't know, these million dollar ministers realli jiak sai!
Saturday, April 03, 2010
Sunday, March 28, 2010
Tuesday, February 23, 2010
Preserving the status quo
I am refering to the Budget Speech 2010.
There is nothing in it that brings real benefits to majority Sporeans.
No minimum wage.
No foreign worker quota.
End of day how will Sporean workers benefit? especially since there is no genuine unions to fight for Sporean workers' rights. And the raised foreign worker levy does not address the fact that businesses and employers have the wonderful "flexibility" to pass the cost onwards by further depressing wages, LOL.
With the help of the 154th running dog media, the public will get the sense that PAP garment is doing something, when really there is nothing of substance at all.
.
There is nothing in it that brings real benefits to majority Sporeans.
No minimum wage.
No foreign worker quota.
End of day how will Sporean workers benefit? especially since there is no genuine unions to fight for Sporean workers' rights. And the raised foreign worker levy does not address the fact that businesses and employers have the wonderful "flexibility" to pass the cost onwards by further depressing wages, LOL.
With the help of the 154th running dog media, the public will get the sense that PAP garment is doing something, when really there is nothing of substance at all.
.
Thursday, February 18, 2010
Temasick... it's not funny though
.
What's the point??
"Someone" should just fucking resign for good.
.
Feb 18, 2010
Adviser to Temasek chief
Role is a more active one than was first thought; he will help in 'leadership development and talent management'THE former chief executive officer of the Singapore Exchange (SGX), Mr Hsieh Fu Hua, has been appointed as 'special adviser' to Temasek Holdings' CEO Ho Ching.
This follows news of his appointment to the Temasek board earlier this month.The announcement yesterday shows that Mr Hsieh, a non-executive director, will be taking on a more active role at the Singapore investment agency than was first thought.
Temasek said yesterday that his remit would involve supporting management 'in leadership development and talent management'.
What's the point??
"Someone" should just fucking resign for good.
.
Tuesday, January 19, 2010
Xie: Trapped in a Property Bubble
By Andy Xie 01.10.2010 18:32
When China's real estate bubble finally bursts while exports become less competitive, the consequences could be severe.
The next 10 years will be more challenging than the past decade. Indeed, unless economic policies are adjusted, China's inflated real estate market could suddenly shrivel while the decade is still young.
China's market share gains in global trade and foreign direct investment due to low costs and rising global demand drove the nation's success. But China is no longer the lowest of the low-cost producers, and it's unlikely to gain market share. Moreover, global demand isn't likely to rise as fast as before; expect economic development at one-third previous speeds.
The biggest risk to China's economy is the desire to maintain past economic growth rates by maximizing investments in property -- an unproductive asset. It supports short-term growth by sacrificing long-term growth as capital's average productivity declines over time.
Local government performance in China is measured according to GDP and fiscal revenue. Property development can achieve high numbers for both quickly. This is why property's share in China's capital allocation is rapidly rising as prices appreciate and volumes increase. This is a politically driven bubble -- and it's already massive. Unless the trend is reversed by reforming incentives for local governments, China's property bubble could mushroom in two years from what's now a dangerous level. The burst could happen in 2012, endangering social and political stability.
The first decade of the 21st century began when an IT bubble burst. It was laced with 9-11 and SARS, and ended with a global financial crisis. It was a horrible decade. Now, much of the world has stagnated or regressed. Western prosperity mid-decade turned out to be a mirage manufactured on Wall Street.
The West didn't accept the need for adjusting living standards as emerging economies caught up, which led to a delayed bubble that made the problem bigger. Now the West, particularly the United States and Britain, faces a terrible decade ahead.
Amid the horror, China has risen like no other. Its GDP in dollars has quadrupled while exports quintupled. Adjusting for dilution due to dollar's external depreciation and internal inflation, from outside looking in, China's economic strength has still more than doubled in real value. It is an unprecedented accomplishment for such a massive country. And the primary drivers of success were gains in global trade and investment market share.
Low base, reform and luck could explain China's success. When the Asian Financial Crisis hit more than a decade ago, China chose not to devalue to maintain competitiveness but lowered state sector costs. When the global economy normalized, China became more competitive. Joining the World Trade Organization was an insurance policy that maximized low-cost benefits, and China's global market share tripled. Internally, China built infrastructure for growth without inflation that could erode competitiveness. The policy mix was perfect.
Neither competitiveness nor winning share in a shrinking market can guarantee growth. But by increasing consumer debt, the United States sustained demand while losing in areas of global investment and income. The credit bubble maintained global demand while China's market share gained rapidly. It was a lucky break for China, but now it's run out. The 2008 financial crisis means the United States is likely to cut debt-financed consumption with half as much growth over the next decade, while Europe and Japan are likely to have zero growth.
Meanwhile, China over the past five years has seen rising prices for production factors such as labor, raw materials, land, environmental control and taxes. These prices had been stable previously. Now, wage costs for export factories have roughly doubled in yuan terms, as have raw material prices. Before the Asian Financial Crisis, China's wage costs were half of Southeast Asia's. Now they are twice as high. Bangladesh's wage costs are even lower. It's likely China will lose market share to these low-cost competitors.
Two of three factors for the past decade's success are gone, so China needs to depend more on improved efficiency for growth. But instead, the recent trend seems to be going the other way. Rising costs and weak demand are making manufacturing less profitable. Hence, capital investment is weak, as reflected in weak equipment import data.
Most local governments seem to embrace property development as a growth savior. But shifting surplus capital into property is likely to lower future growth by decreasing average capital efficiency. This deters consumption development by increasing property expenditure expectations, and threatens financial stability by increasing loan levels, using overvalued land as collateral.
Other Asian economies such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan failed to shed export dependency and develop domestic growth. Periodic spikes in consumption are usually due to asset inflation. Once a country loses export market share on rising costs, it stagnates because property bubbles during high growth periods deter consumption while overwhelming the middle class with housing expenses. China may be following the same path: Despite a decade of talking about promoting consumption, that share of GDP has been declining year in, year out.
Japan stagnated roughly at per capita income of US$ 40,000 over the past two decades. Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan have stagnated at about US$ 20,000 for the past decade. Stagnation at such high income levels doesn't seem bad. However, China's size means its exports face challenges at much lower per capita income levels. Unless China changes its growth model, it could stagnate at a much lower level.
The overwhelming desire for getting rich quick dominates every nook, fissure and strata of Chinese society. Such desires cannot be fulfilled; the terrible logic of economics is that money must circulate. Creating bubbles can temporarily blind people to this logic, as overvalued assets substitute for money to fill psychological needs. This is why, whenever conditions permit, China seems to have asset bubbles.
Bubbles exaggerate reality but are not formed out of thin air. Cheap money and strong growth are the usual ingredients for bubble-making. Both existed over the past five years. But now, China depends entirely on cheap money to support overvalued assets. Cheap money came from past exports and was warehoused in banks. Cash also came from hot money inflows due to the yuan's peg to the dollar and weak Fed dollar policy.
Neither money source is sustainable. The dollar has bottomed. The Fed will begin raising interest rates in 2010. The combination of China's strong loan and weak export growth is reducing bank liquidity, but inflation soon may force China to tighten anyway. The cheap money may not last long.
China's exports are recovering from a low base – a trend that may last through 2010. But one should not confuse low base recovery with a revival of past trends.
The high export growth era is over for three reasons. China's market share in global trade is twice as big as its GDP share. The odds are low that China could continue to expand its market share. Second, the tide won't rise as fast as before. The Greenspan era saw a credit bubble supercharge western consumption, but the bubble has burst. Odds are that future trade growth will be half or less as in the past. Finally, a western employment crisis will lead to protectionism targeting China. Other developing countries may gain market share at China's expense.
One possible way to prolong the bubble is to appreciate the currency, as Japan did after the Plaza Accord, to contain inflation and attract hot money. Such a strategy will not work in China. Japan's businesses were already at the cutting edge in production technologies and had pricing power during currency appreciation. They could raise export prices to partly offset currency appreciation. Chinese companies don't have such advantages but rely on low costs to compete.
After export-led growth peaks, consumption is the alternative to sustaining growth at a lower rate. This transition would require a wholesale change in the political economy. The key is to increase middle class disposable income and lower consumption costs. No East Asian economy has made this transition.
China has been trying to promote consumption for a decade. However, consumption's share of GDP has declined annually. The reason is the policy environment has been squeezing China's nascent middle class through high property and auto prices along with high income tax rates. China's disproportionate dependency on exports and withering consumption components are results of national policies, not the peculiar characteristics of Chinese households.
A large, vibrant middle class is the foundation of a stable, modern society. China's policies rightfully care for the lower class. Yet the semi-market economy offers a few spectacular gains from arbitrage and speculation. Society is drifting toward a small, super-rich minority along with a small -- possibly less than 20 percent of the population – yet heavily burdened middle class, and a vast, low-income majority. Such an income structure cannot support a balanced economy, forcing export dependence.
China's rapid economic growth has spawned millions of white-collar jobs: managers, engineers, accountants and bankers. Such jobs should provide middle class income for buying property, cars and vacations. However, property prices have increased more rapidly than middle class income, increasing fear of the future.
China's property market is creating winners and losers based on timing. All other factors – including education and experience -- have been marginalized as the economy rewards speculators. And as more play the game, the speculator ranks rise and fewer people work, perhaps contributing to a labor shortage.
In the previous decade, the West refused to acknowledge its competitiveness problem and created a bubble to hide it. I am afraid China could try the same in the next decade, and the consequences could be serious. Fear of consequences could lead many to argue for sustaining the bubble, but that worsens the problem.
During a bubble period, most people think nothing will bring it down. But bubbles always burst, and the longer one is prolonged, the more severe the consequences. Oversupply or rising interest rates will bring down China's property bubble. The former brought down the U.S. bubble, and later Hong Kong's.
China's banks always seem ready to roll over credit lines for developers during market downturns. Hence, supplies tend to dry up during market downturns, preventing price adjustments. Such manipulation has created a speculative psychology that theorizes the government would never let prices fall. When speculators think prices won't fall, speculative demand lasts as long as banks have the liquidity.
The liquidity environment, however, is likely to turn against the bubble soon. The killer is inflation driven by a surge in money printing. The average lag between currency creation and inflation is 18 months in the United States. China's lag could be two years since the government uses subsidies to suppress inflation. By 2012, China could experience 1990s-like inflation. And that's when the property bubble will probably burst.
When China's real estate bubble finally bursts while exports become less competitive, the consequences could be severe.
The next 10 years will be more challenging than the past decade. Indeed, unless economic policies are adjusted, China's inflated real estate market could suddenly shrivel while the decade is still young.
China's market share gains in global trade and foreign direct investment due to low costs and rising global demand drove the nation's success. But China is no longer the lowest of the low-cost producers, and it's unlikely to gain market share. Moreover, global demand isn't likely to rise as fast as before; expect economic development at one-third previous speeds.
The biggest risk to China's economy is the desire to maintain past economic growth rates by maximizing investments in property -- an unproductive asset. It supports short-term growth by sacrificing long-term growth as capital's average productivity declines over time.
Local government performance in China is measured according to GDP and fiscal revenue. Property development can achieve high numbers for both quickly. This is why property's share in China's capital allocation is rapidly rising as prices appreciate and volumes increase. This is a politically driven bubble -- and it's already massive. Unless the trend is reversed by reforming incentives for local governments, China's property bubble could mushroom in two years from what's now a dangerous level. The burst could happen in 2012, endangering social and political stability.
The first decade of the 21st century began when an IT bubble burst. It was laced with 9-11 and SARS, and ended with a global financial crisis. It was a horrible decade. Now, much of the world has stagnated or regressed. Western prosperity mid-decade turned out to be a mirage manufactured on Wall Street.
The West didn't accept the need for adjusting living standards as emerging economies caught up, which led to a delayed bubble that made the problem bigger. Now the West, particularly the United States and Britain, faces a terrible decade ahead.
Amid the horror, China has risen like no other. Its GDP in dollars has quadrupled while exports quintupled. Adjusting for dilution due to dollar's external depreciation and internal inflation, from outside looking in, China's economic strength has still more than doubled in real value. It is an unprecedented accomplishment for such a massive country. And the primary drivers of success were gains in global trade and investment market share.
Low base, reform and luck could explain China's success. When the Asian Financial Crisis hit more than a decade ago, China chose not to devalue to maintain competitiveness but lowered state sector costs. When the global economy normalized, China became more competitive. Joining the World Trade Organization was an insurance policy that maximized low-cost benefits, and China's global market share tripled. Internally, China built infrastructure for growth without inflation that could erode competitiveness. The policy mix was perfect.
Neither competitiveness nor winning share in a shrinking market can guarantee growth. But by increasing consumer debt, the United States sustained demand while losing in areas of global investment and income. The credit bubble maintained global demand while China's market share gained rapidly. It was a lucky break for China, but now it's run out. The 2008 financial crisis means the United States is likely to cut debt-financed consumption with half as much growth over the next decade, while Europe and Japan are likely to have zero growth.
Meanwhile, China over the past five years has seen rising prices for production factors such as labor, raw materials, land, environmental control and taxes. These prices had been stable previously. Now, wage costs for export factories have roughly doubled in yuan terms, as have raw material prices. Before the Asian Financial Crisis, China's wage costs were half of Southeast Asia's. Now they are twice as high. Bangladesh's wage costs are even lower. It's likely China will lose market share to these low-cost competitors.
Two of three factors for the past decade's success are gone, so China needs to depend more on improved efficiency for growth. But instead, the recent trend seems to be going the other way. Rising costs and weak demand are making manufacturing less profitable. Hence, capital investment is weak, as reflected in weak equipment import data.
Most local governments seem to embrace property development as a growth savior. But shifting surplus capital into property is likely to lower future growth by decreasing average capital efficiency. This deters consumption development by increasing property expenditure expectations, and threatens financial stability by increasing loan levels, using overvalued land as collateral.
Other Asian economies such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan failed to shed export dependency and develop domestic growth. Periodic spikes in consumption are usually due to asset inflation. Once a country loses export market share on rising costs, it stagnates because property bubbles during high growth periods deter consumption while overwhelming the middle class with housing expenses. China may be following the same path: Despite a decade of talking about promoting consumption, that share of GDP has been declining year in, year out.
Japan stagnated roughly at per capita income of US$ 40,000 over the past two decades. Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan have stagnated at about US$ 20,000 for the past decade. Stagnation at such high income levels doesn't seem bad. However, China's size means its exports face challenges at much lower per capita income levels. Unless China changes its growth model, it could stagnate at a much lower level.
The overwhelming desire for getting rich quick dominates every nook, fissure and strata of Chinese society. Such desires cannot be fulfilled; the terrible logic of economics is that money must circulate. Creating bubbles can temporarily blind people to this logic, as overvalued assets substitute for money to fill psychological needs. This is why, whenever conditions permit, China seems to have asset bubbles.
Bubbles exaggerate reality but are not formed out of thin air. Cheap money and strong growth are the usual ingredients for bubble-making. Both existed over the past five years. But now, China depends entirely on cheap money to support overvalued assets. Cheap money came from past exports and was warehoused in banks. Cash also came from hot money inflows due to the yuan's peg to the dollar and weak Fed dollar policy.
Neither money source is sustainable. The dollar has bottomed. The Fed will begin raising interest rates in 2010. The combination of China's strong loan and weak export growth is reducing bank liquidity, but inflation soon may force China to tighten anyway. The cheap money may not last long.
China's exports are recovering from a low base – a trend that may last through 2010. But one should not confuse low base recovery with a revival of past trends.
The high export growth era is over for three reasons. China's market share in global trade is twice as big as its GDP share. The odds are low that China could continue to expand its market share. Second, the tide won't rise as fast as before. The Greenspan era saw a credit bubble supercharge western consumption, but the bubble has burst. Odds are that future trade growth will be half or less as in the past. Finally, a western employment crisis will lead to protectionism targeting China. Other developing countries may gain market share at China's expense.
One possible way to prolong the bubble is to appreciate the currency, as Japan did after the Plaza Accord, to contain inflation and attract hot money. Such a strategy will not work in China. Japan's businesses were already at the cutting edge in production technologies and had pricing power during currency appreciation. They could raise export prices to partly offset currency appreciation. Chinese companies don't have such advantages but rely on low costs to compete.
After export-led growth peaks, consumption is the alternative to sustaining growth at a lower rate. This transition would require a wholesale change in the political economy. The key is to increase middle class disposable income and lower consumption costs. No East Asian economy has made this transition.
China has been trying to promote consumption for a decade. However, consumption's share of GDP has declined annually. The reason is the policy environment has been squeezing China's nascent middle class through high property and auto prices along with high income tax rates. China's disproportionate dependency on exports and withering consumption components are results of national policies, not the peculiar characteristics of Chinese households.
A large, vibrant middle class is the foundation of a stable, modern society. China's policies rightfully care for the lower class. Yet the semi-market economy offers a few spectacular gains from arbitrage and speculation. Society is drifting toward a small, super-rich minority along with a small -- possibly less than 20 percent of the population – yet heavily burdened middle class, and a vast, low-income majority. Such an income structure cannot support a balanced economy, forcing export dependence.
China's rapid economic growth has spawned millions of white-collar jobs: managers, engineers, accountants and bankers. Such jobs should provide middle class income for buying property, cars and vacations. However, property prices have increased more rapidly than middle class income, increasing fear of the future.
China's property market is creating winners and losers based on timing. All other factors – including education and experience -- have been marginalized as the economy rewards speculators. And as more play the game, the speculator ranks rise and fewer people work, perhaps contributing to a labor shortage.
In the previous decade, the West refused to acknowledge its competitiveness problem and created a bubble to hide it. I am afraid China could try the same in the next decade, and the consequences could be serious. Fear of consequences could lead many to argue for sustaining the bubble, but that worsens the problem.
During a bubble period, most people think nothing will bring it down. But bubbles always burst, and the longer one is prolonged, the more severe the consequences. Oversupply or rising interest rates will bring down China's property bubble. The former brought down the U.S. bubble, and later Hong Kong's.
China's banks always seem ready to roll over credit lines for developers during market downturns. Hence, supplies tend to dry up during market downturns, preventing price adjustments. Such manipulation has created a speculative psychology that theorizes the government would never let prices fall. When speculators think prices won't fall, speculative demand lasts as long as banks have the liquidity.
The liquidity environment, however, is likely to turn against the bubble soon. The killer is inflation driven by a surge in money printing. The average lag between currency creation and inflation is 18 months in the United States. China's lag could be two years since the government uses subsidies to suppress inflation. By 2012, China could experience 1990s-like inflation. And that's when the property bubble will probably burst.
Friday, January 01, 2010
Thursday, October 29, 2009
Central Banks, Arsonists and Playing with Fire
Andy Xie: Money supply growth has sparked an asset market boom that supports the economy, not the other way around. Don't get burned.
Oct 28
(Caijing Magazine) Is money demand efficient? The answer could help decide what's best for monetary policy. Moreover, as financial institutions have demanded more money to support their leverage, money demand efficiency has become equivalent to financial system efficiency.
I think the answer is no. Monetary authorities and central banks have a responsibility to take this reality into account. Their best approach would be to limit the deviation of monetary growth from nominal GDP growth. In particular, sustained deviation should be corrected -- even if the underlying economy suffers in the short term.
This is a serious academic topic these days. Some of the world's most prominent economists hold different views. Why discuss it here? First, it's important to everyone. After all, retail investors dominate China's asset markets, and most base their investments or speculation decisions on expectations that the government will not let asset prices fall. The credibility of this expectation depends on whether money available for government spending is limited. A discussion on monetary expansion's limits can help Chinese investors assess the risks of their investment decisions.
Second, money supplies worldwide are rising much faster than nominal GDP growth rates. That is, monetary growth is being used to support leverage, mostly in the financial sector. Of course, the reason is central banks have responded to the financial crisis by cutting interest rates and sometimes force-feeding banks with liquidity in hopes more lending will boost the economy. But instead, money has flowed into and led to buoyancy in asset markets (stocks and bonds in developed economies, and almost everything in emerging economies).
Buoyant asset prices have stabilized the global economy. Most analysts say buoyant asset markets reflect correct expectations of a buoyant global economy. I don't think this is true. As we saw in the past decade, the latest asset market boom is supporting the economy, not the other way around. In other words, it's a bubble.
Even though the global economy is staging a modest recovery, mainly on inventory restocking and fiscal stimuli, the overall economic situation is still difficult. Unemployment rates in OECD countries are at record highs. Global trade is still at one-fifth its peak level. The small- and medium-sized economies that employ most of the world's people are struggling. We see a contrast – unprecedented in modern times -- between the asset market boom and real economic difficulties.
The gap is creating social tension around the world. While workers and businesses struggle, asset players are reaping substantial paper profits again. As the central bank's monetary policy is behind the asset boom, we should ask whether the policy is achieving its goal by helping the real economy, or whether it is just helping speculators and hoping they have something left over for the real economy.
The financial crisis exposed gross inefficiencies in the massive amounts of money financial institutions received from central banks. Supplying so much money to the same people who caused the crisis -- and with the same incentives -- does not feel right. The argument in favor of this policy is that, when the house is on fire, you have to do whatever to extinguish the fire and find the culprit later. The problem is that, in this case, the arsonists have been asked to put out the fire. How can we be sure they won't start another fire?
Most argue that the answer is not to limit the money supply but to reform the financial system. In this way, future demand for money would be efficient. But so far, no corrective reforms have been implemented in response to the financial crisis. Why? Because the global financial system became so big over the past decade that it has co-opted central banks, legislators and entire governments. Any reforms that do come will not address the main factors leading to the current crisis.
Even the best reforms will never resolve a problem based on the fact that financial professionals generally risk other people's money: They get big rewards when bets go right and don't have to pay when bets go wrong. The problem with this incentive system suggests the global financial system is structurally biased toward taking on more risk than what would be taken in an efficient market.
The only way to counter this is for central banks to limit money supplies. Asset inflation over the past 10 years and the catastrophe incurred when it burst lend credibility to this argument.
Stagflation in the 1970s spurred economists to study why monetary stimulus, over time, loses its punch. Demand is stimulated, but that leads to inflation. And it's led to development of the rational expectation theory to explain the average Joe's response to monetary policy. Its conclusion, although obvious to the uneducated, is that policymakers cannot fool people again and again. For that observation, many have won Nobel prizes. Milton Friedman advocated money supply growth targets as a guiding principle for central banking. Such an approach would put central banking on autopilot with a target of money growth and leave the market to decide interest rates.
The rational expectation theory was extended further to explain investor behavior. This led to the efficient market theory, which posits that, under some conditions, rational investors will lead to efficient asset prices that correctly anticipate the future. Academic jargon for efficient asset price says that it includes all useful information about the future. That laid the foundation for tearing down the regulatory structure built from the lessons of the Great Depression.
Stagflation of the 1970s led to central banking to focus narrowly on short-term inflation. The efficient market theory prompted central banks to completely accommodate financial institutions that demanded money for leverage funding. This combination of policy steps laid the foundation for the big bubble in the past decade. As globalization kept inflation low, Wall Street could source an unlimited amount of liquidity from central banks for bubble making.
Even though globalization has maxed out, and the global economy has now entered an inflation age, the bursting of the last bubble is a negative demand shock that's keeping inflation low for the time being. This has created another window for bubble-making. A last-train psychology means this bubble is growing quickly, totally oblivious of economic fundamentals. In addition to the usual misinformation from market makers who want to sucker people, government officials, financial professionals and the media are also saying what speculators want to hear. This is yet another episode of an inefficient market adventure.
Institutional investors dominate financial markets in western countries, while retail or individual investors are the main players in the east. Neither group is thinking or behaving rationally. Most institutional investors are benchmarked against market indexes quarterly, and with cash-holding limits. These constraints obviously have disadvantaged them and made it extremely hard to outperform the indexes. This is why most institutional investors are closet indexers. Extra management costs guarantee that most institutional investors under-perform market indexes and don't add to market efficiency.
Absolute performance funds or hedge funds are the biggest development in financial market in the past 10 years. But they have been amplifying market volatility rather than improving efficiency. The hedge fund industry has made managers rich, not investors, because managers are remunerated with a cut on the upside, and don't pay up for the downside. So they are structurally incentivized to long volatility while playing something like the coin-flip game "heads I win, tails you lose."
Regardless how one tries to improve the incentive structure for institutional investors, nothing could overcome the incentive distortions tied to the practice of managing other people's money. Institutionalization, once hailed as a great step forward in improving market efficiency, has proven to diminish efficiency. Developing countries that face highly volatile markets have been looking to institutionalization as a way to calm them. They should think twice. Institutionalization may decrease short-term volatility but make up for this advantage with a big crash.
Retail or individual investors routinely mistake volatility for trend. Their herd behavior creates self-fulfilling trends that are mainly temporary. From time to time, such herd behavior lasts a long time and leads to big bubbles, which in turn lead to major misallocations of resources.
To minimize chances of future financial crises, one could reform the financial system to make it less crisis-prone, or target both asset and CPI inflation when setting monetary policy. When the crisis began a year ago, policymakers around the world swore to reform the system while ridding it of corruption and excess leverage. After governments bailed out financial institutions with trillions of dollars, the impetus for reform waned. Reform bills in the U.S. Congress have been watered down so much that they would not prevent another major crisis.
Capital requirements and transparency are key elements to address in any effective financial reform. And unless reforms target problems in the derivatives market, they will not be effective. Over-the-counter derivatives carry hundreds of trillions of dollars in notional value, thriving in an opaque environment. Derivatives in theory help buyers decrease risk, but in practice they are merely tools for taking on more risk, hiding leverage through complex structuring. Market-makers can earn high profits by fooling buyers and regulators, overcharging while putting up little capital to warehouse such high-risk products. If the market is made transparent and capital requirements are reasonable, this business would shrink.
Every party ends sooner or later, and I see two scenarios for the next bust. First, every trader is borrowing dollars to buy something else. Most traders on Wall Street are Americans, British or Australians. They know the United States well. The Fed is keeping interest rates at zero, and the U.S. government is supporting a weak dollar to boost U.S. exports. You don't need to be a genius to know that the U.S. government is helping you borrow dollars for speculating in something else.
But these traders don't know much about other countries, particularly emerging economies. They go there once or twice a year, chaperoned by U.S. investment banks eager to sell something. They want to think everything other than the U.S. dollar will appreciate; Wall Street banks tell them so. Since there are so many of these traders, their predictions are self-fulfilling in the short-term. For example, since the Australian dollar has appreciated by 35 percent from the bottom, they now feel very smart while sitting on massive paper profits.
When a trade like this one becomes too crowded, a small shock is enough to trigger a hurricane. There must be massive leverage in many positions, but one just never knows where. When something happens, all these traders will run like mad for the exit, and that could lead to another crisis.
Surging oil prices could be another party crasher. This could trigger a surge in inflation expectation and crash the bond market. The resulting high bond yields might force central banks to raise interest rates to cool inflation fear. Another major downturn in asset prices would reignite fear over the balance sheets of major global financial institutions, resulting in more chaos.
Twice in recent years, oil prices surged into triple-digit territory, wreaking havoc on financial markets and the global economy. In 2006, surging oil prices toppled the U.S. property market, debunking the story that property prices never fall -- a premise upon which subprime lending was based. Oil prices fell sharply amid the subprime crisis period while the market feared collapse in demand. The Fed came to the rescue and, in summer 2007, began cutting interest rates aggressively in the name of combating the recessionary impact of the subprime crisis. Oil prices surged afterward on optimism that the Fed would rescue the economy and oil demand. It worked to offset the Fed's stimulus, accelerated the economic decline, and pulled the rug out from under the derivatives bubble. The ensuing fear of falling demand again caused oil prices to collapse.
Oil is a perfect ingredient for a bubble: Oil supplies cannot respond to a price surge quickly. It takes a long time to expand production capacity, and oil demand cannot decrease quickly due to lifestyle stickiness and production modes. Low-price sensitivities on both demand and supply sides make it an ideal product for bubble-making. When liquidity is cheap and easily obtained, oil speculators can pop up anywhere.
Oil speculators are no longer restricted to secretive hedge funds. Average Joes can buy exchange traded funds (ETFs) that let them own oil or anything else. Why not? Central banks have made clear their intentions to keep money supplies as high as possible, debasing the value of paper money to help debtors. It seems no good deed is unpunished in this world. If you speculate big, governments will offer a bailout when your bets go wrong and cut interest rates and guarantee your debts, allowing bigger bets. People who live within their means and save some for a rainy day see dreams shattered. Central banks can't wait to break their nest eggs.
It is better to be a speculator in this world. The powers that be are with you. Maybe everyone should be a hedge fund; ETFs give you this opportunity. As the masses are incentivized to avoid paper money while buying hard assets, the price of oil could surge to triple-digit territory again. Oil bubbles are easy to come and quick to go because the oxygen needed for its existence disappears after it kills other bubbles.
A word of caution for all would-be speculators: You'll want to run for your life as soon as the bond market takes a big fall. And the case for a double dip in 2010 is already strong. Inventory restocking and fiscal stimuli are behind the current economic recovery, and when these run out of steam next year, the odds are quite low that western consumers will take over. High unemployment rates will keep incomes too weak to support spending. And consumers are unlikely to borrow and spend again.
Many analysts argue that, as long as unemployment rates are high, more stimuli should be applied. As I have argued before, a supply-demand mismatch rather than demand weakness per se is the main reason for high unemployment. More stimuli would only trigger inflation and financial instability.
Stagflation in the 1970s discredited a generation of central bankers. They thought they could trade a bit more inflation for a lot more economic growth. Today's crisis will discredit a generation of central bankers who ignore asset inflation by sometimes trading asset inflation for a bit of economic growth. Those who play with fire often get burned, even when the arsonists don't.
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Saturday, October 17, 2009
Xie: For Economic Stimuli, a Revolving Exit Door
Can interest rate adjustments, currency devaluation and zigzag policymaking help unwind economic stimuli? It depends.
(Caijing Magazine) Australia recently raised its policy interest rate 25 bps, becoming the first major economy to do so since the financial crisis a year ago prompted all major economies to rapidly cut interest rates to historical lows.
Financial markets had been chattering about economic stimuli exits for about a month before Canberra's move. The consensus was that central banks would keep rates extremely low through 2010, and possibly beyond, on grounds that the economic recovery is still shaky.
Central banks also have been discussing the subject. Their messages are, first, that they know how to exit and will exit before inflation becomes a problem and, second, that they don't see the need to exit anytime soon. They try to assure bond inventors not to worry about their holdings, despite low bond yields, while trying to persuade stock investors they need not worry about high stock prices, as liquidity will remain strong for the foreseeable future. So far, central banks have made both groups happy. But Australia's action is likely to raise concern among financial investors who hold expensive stocks and bonds.
Each economy will exit at its own pace, according to local conditions. First, the United States and Britain, where property bubbles have burst and could not be revived through low interest rates, will increase rates next year at a pace in line with the speed of inflation expectation. Their goal is to keep real interest rates as low as possible to support financial institutions still sitting on mountains of bad assets. They don't want to stop inflation, but want to limit the pace of its increase. Through low real interest rates, their economies could decrease debt leverage. I think the Fed would raise interest rate by 100 bps in 2010, 150 bps in 2011, and 200 bps in 2012. The United States could be stuck with an inflation rate of 4 to 5 percent by 2012 – and for years to come.
Second, China's stimulus program will zigzag mainly through its lending policy. China's currency will be pegged to the U.S. dollar for the foreseeable future, which determines the end point for China's monetary policy. Its inflation and interest rates will likely be similar to those in the United States.
Third, due to their strong currencies, countries in the euro zone and Japan will have higher real interest rates, lower nominal interest rates, and lower real economic growth rates. They will raise interest rates more slowly than the United States, and will have lower inflation rates as well.
My central point is that the global economy is cruising toward mild stagflation with a 2 percent growth rate and 4 percent inflation rate. This scenario is the best that the central banks can hope to achieve; it combines an acceptable combination of financial stability, growth and inflation. But this equilibrium is balanced on a pinhead. It requires central banks to constantly manage expectations. The world could easily fall into hyperinflation or deflation if one major central bank makes a significant mistake.
In modern economics, monetary stimulus is considered an effective tool to soften the economic cycle. While there are many theories about why monetary policy works, the dirty little secret is that it works by inflating asset markets. By inflating risk asset valuation, it leads to more demand for debt that turns into demand growth. In other words, monetary policy works by creating asset bubbles.
It is difficult to reverse this kind of stimulus. A complete reversal requires that household, business and government sectors decrease debts to pre-stimulus levels. This is why national ratios of indebtedness-debt to GDP have been rising over the past three decades while central bankers smoothed economic cycles through monetary policy. It led to a massive debt bubble that burst, leading to the ongoing slump.
The current stimulus round is different in terms of its effects. Despite low interest rates, household and business sectors in developed economies have not been increasing indebtedness; falling property and stock prices have diminished their equity capital for supporting debt. The public sectors have rapidly ramped up debt to support failing financial institutions and increase government spending to cushion the economic downturn. Neither is easy to unwind.
By some estimates, US$ 9 trillion has been spent to shore up failing financial institutions. A big chunk of that money was borrowed against illiquid and problematic assets on bank balance sheets. As the debt market refused to accept that collateral, governments and central banks stepped in. Today, it is impossible for banks to liquidate such assets without huge paper losses. Hence, if central banks call the loans, they are likely to go bankrupt.
Of course, central banks can suck in money from elsewhere to substitute money that's tied up in non-performing loans. They are unlikely to do so, however, as it would depress a good part of the economy in order to support the bad. And that could easily lead to another recession.
The bottom line is that, regardless what central banks say and do, the world will be awash in a lot more money after the crisis than before -- money that will lead to inflation. Even though all central banks talk about being tough on inflation now, they are unlikely to act tough. After a debt bubble bursts, there are two effective options for deleveraging: bankruptcy or inflation. Government actions over the past year show they cannot accept the first option. The second is likely.
Hyperinflation was used in Germany in the 1920s and Russia in late 1990s to wipe slates clean. The technique was essentially mass default by debtors. But robbing savers en masse has serious political consequences. Existing governments, at least, will fall. Most governments would rather find another way out. Mild stagflation is probably the best one can hope for after a debt bubble. A benefit is that stagflation can spread the pain over many years. A downside is that the pain lingers.
If a central bank can keep real interest rates at zero, and real growth rates at 2.5 percent, leverage could be decreased 22 percent in a decade. If real interest rates can be kept at minus 1 percent, leverage could drop 30 percent in a decade. The cost is probably a 5 percent inflation rate. It works, but slowly.
If stagflation is the goal, why might central banks such as the Fed talk tough about inflation now? The purpose is to persuade bondholders to accept low bond yields. The Fed is effectively influencing mortgage interest rates by buying Fannie Mae bonds. This is the most important aspect of the Fed's stimulus policy. It effectively limits Treasury yields, too. The Fed would be in no position to buy if all Treasury holders decide to sell, and high Treasury yields would push down the property market once again.
The Fed hopes to fool bondholders or lock them in by quickly devaluing the dollar. Foreign bondholders have already realized losses. The dollar index is down 37 percent from its 2002 peak. A significant portion of this devaluation is a down payment for future inflation.
I think Britain is pursuing devaluation for the same reason. Among all major economies, Britain's is the most dependent on global finance. It benefited greatly during the global financial boom that began in the mid-1990s. The British currency and property values appreciated dramatically, pricing out other economic activities. But now that the global financial bubble has burst, its economic pillar is gone. Other economic activities cannot be brought back to Britain without major cost cuts. But it can't cut taxes to improve competitiveness, as fiscal revenues depend on the financial sector and already face a major shortfall. Another option is to let property prices fall, as they have in Japan. But that choice might sink Britain's entire banking sector. Hence, devaluing the pound is probably the only available option for stabilizing the British economy.
Some may argue that Britain is not expensive anymore. The problem is that being less expensive is not good enough. Prices have to be low enough to attract non-financial economic activities despite a rising tax burden. The pound's value must be very low to achieve that goal. Five years ago, I predicted the pound and euro would reach parity. It seems the day is finally here. But I'm not sure parity would be enough; the pound may have to be cheaper.
Of course, the euro zone is a mess, too. With high unemployment rates, a stagnant economy and imploding property markets in southern Europe, shouldn't the euro's value decline, too? Yes, it should. But it won't. The European Central Bank was structured solely to maintain price stability. With so many governments and one central bank, ECB is unlikely to change anytime soon. Hence, it won't respond to a strong euro quickly. A strong euro and low inflation could form a self-generating spiral, as we see in Japan. Even as interest rates in other economies rise, the euro zone's real interest rate could be higher still, supporting a strong euro.
At some point, euro zone monetary policy may change. It would require governments in the zone's major economies come together and change the ECB. That may come in three years, but not now. The trigger could be one country threatening to exit the euro. Italy and Spain come to mind.
Meanwhile, Japan is an enigma. It has been locked in a vicious cycle of economic decline with a strong yen and deflation. Most Japanese people have a strong yen psychology. Politicians and central bank leaders reflect this popular sentiment, which is based on an aging population. Wealth is concentrated among voting pensioners for whom a strong yen and deflation theoretically improve their purchasing power. But I think various theories that explain Japan's behavior are not good enough. The best explanation is that Japan is run by incompetents, and some are downright stupid. They have locked Japan in an icebox and refuse to come out.
Japan is a giant debt bubble. Its zero interest rate, supported by a strong yen and deflation, has turned the debt bubble into an iceberg. You don't have to worry -- until it melts. Unfortunately, when the temperature reaches a critical point, the iceberg will melt suddenly, all at once. That turning point will come when Japan begins to run a significant current account deficit. The day may be near.
For Japan to avoid calamity, it should deal with deflation and skyrocketing government debt now. The only way forward is for the central bank to monetize Japanese Government Bonds. That would lead to yen devaluation and inflation. Pensioners will complain, but it's better than a complete meltdown later.
Japan's new ruling party DPJ has no vision like that. It doesn't have the guts to go against popular preference for a strong yen. Without a growing economy, though, the DPJ has little to play with. The whole country has sworn to debt, led by a government with a massive fiscal deficit. The DPJ may only reallocate some spending, which would make no difference for the economy. It seems Japan will remain in the icebox until the day of reckoning.
These snapshots of Britain, the euro zone and Japan suggest everyone needs a weak currency. Those that don't have one simply don't know yet. They'll come around eventually. One outcome could be rotating devaluations and high inflation for the global economy.
Developing countries with healthy banks have a different problem on their hands. By responding to falling imports with stimuli, they inflated their property markets. China, India, South Korea and Hong Kong have inflated property bubbles in spite of slower economic growth rates. The contradictions between a property bubble and a weak economy can lead to zigzags in policymaking.
As China is one-third of the emerging economy bloc -- and exerts a great deal of influence over commodity prices that other emerging economies depend upon -- its monetary policy has a big impact on global financial markets. Its monetary stimulus in the first half of 2009 went disproportionately into property, stock and commodity markets. As profitability for the businesses that serve the real economy remain weak, little monetary stimulus went into private sector capital formation.
The state sector ramped up investment somewhat for policy, not profit, concerns. Thus, China is experiencing a relatively weak real economy and red hot asset markets. Government policy is being pushed by both concerns. Cooling the asset bubble would cool the economy further. Not to cool the bubble could lead to a catastrophe later. Monetary policy zigzags, shifting according to concerns that arise, has the up hand.
It seems limiting credit growth is the current policy focus. But if the economy shows further signs of weakness in the fourth quarter 2009 and first quarter 2010, the policy may revert to loose bank lending again. The zigzagging will stop when China's loan deposit ratio is high enough, i.e. when increased lending increases interest rates. As the yuan is pegged to the dollar, China's monetary policy would become much less flexible after excess liquidity in the banking system is gone.
I think Australia is raising interest rates ahead of others for a unique set of concerns. Australia has been experiencing property and household debt bubbles similar to those in the United States and Britain. Its bubbles are probably larger than America's. But because its commodity exports have performed well, its economy has fared better than others. Hence, its property market has seen less of an adjustment. A relatively good economy could embolden Australia's household sector to borrow more and continue the game. This is why it needs to increase interest rates -- to prevent the bubble from re-inflating. The United States and Britain don't have this problem; their household sectors are convinced that the game is finished and they must change.
A review of unique factors and institutional biases around the world shows that exiting a stimulus would be quite different in different economies. The United States and Britain, the euro zone and Japan, and China and India are three blocs that face varying challenges and will handle stimuli exits in different ways.
Most analysts think a benchmark for exiting a stimulus is robust economic recovery. That's not so. Loose monetary policy cannot bring back a strong economy due to the supply-demand mismatch formed during the bubble. Re-matching takes time, and no stimulus can bring a quick solution.
The main purpose of monetary policy ahead is facilitating the deleveraging process, either through negative real interest rates and-or income growth. Preventing runaway inflation expectation is a key constraint on monetary policy. One key variable to watch is the price of oil, with its major impact on inflation expectation. If oil prices take off again, the Fed could be pushed to raise interest rates sooner and higher than expected.
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Thursday, October 01, 2009
Xie: Why One Bubble Burst Deserves Another
As always, its all in the timing...
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Andy Xie: Why One Bubble Burst Deserves Another
09-28 Caijing
The financial crisis taught crucial lessons about the dangers of bubbles, loose regulation and debt. It's a pity we didn't learn.
Lehman Brothers collapsed one year ago. The U.S. government refused a bailout and warned other financial institutions to be careful. The government felt other institutions had already severed their dealings with Lehman's investment network, and that a collapse could be walled in.
Little did the government realize that the whole financial system was one giant Lehman. The securities firm borrowed short-term money to punt in risky and illiquid assets. The debt market supported the financial sector, believing the government would bail out everyone in a crisis. But when Lehman was allowed to collapse, the market's faith was shaken.
The debt market refused to roll over financing for financial institutions. Of course, financial institutions couldn't unload assets to pay off debts. The whole financial system started teetering. Eventually, governments and central banks were forced to bail out everyone with direct lending or guarantees.
The Lehman collapse strategy backfired. Governments were forced to make implicit guarantees explicit. Ever since, no one has dared argue about letting a major financial institution go bankrupt. The debt market is supporting financial institutions again only because they are confident in government guarantees. The government lost in the Lehman saga, and Wall Street won.
So Lehman died in vain. Today, governments and central banks are celebrating their victorious stabilizing of the global financial system. To achieve the same, they could have saved Lehman with US$ 50 billion. Instead, they have spent trillions of dollars -- probably more than US$ 10 trillion when we get the final tally -- to reach the same objective. Meanwhile, a broader goal to reform the financial system has seen absolutely no progress.
First, let's look at the most basic objective of deleveraging the financial sector. Top executives on Wall Street talk about having cut leverage by half. That is actually due to an expanding equity capital base rather than shrinking assets. According to the Federal Reserve, total debt for the financial sector was US$ 16.5 trillion in the second quarter 2009 -- about the same as the US$ 16.6 trillion reported one year earlier. After the Lehman collapse, financial sector leverage increased due to Fed support. It has come down as the Fed pulled back some support, creating the perception of deleveraging. The basic conclusion is that financial sector debt is the same as it was a year ago, and the reduction in leverage is due to equity base expansion, partly due to government funding.
Second, financial institutions are operating as before. Institutions led in reporting profit gains in the first half 2009 during a period of global economic contraction. When corporate earnings expand in a shrinking economy, redistribution plays a role. Most of these strong earnings came from trading income, which is really all about getting in and out of financial markets at the right time. With assets backed up by US$ 16.5 trillion in debt, a 1 percent asset appreciation would lead to US$ 16.5 billion in profits. Considering how much financial markets rose in the first half, strong profits were easy to imagine.
Trading gains are a form of income redistribution. In the best scenario, smart traders buy assets ahead of others because they see a stronger economy ahead. Such redistribution comes from giving a bigger share of the future growth to those who are willing to take risk ahead of others. Past experience, however, demonstrates that most trading profits involve redistributions from many to a few in zero-sum bubbles. The trick is to get the credulous masses to join the bubble game at high prices. When the bubble bursts, even though asset prices may be the same as they were at the beginning, most people lose money to the few. What's occurring now is another bubble that is again redistributing income from the masses to the few.
Third, financial supervision has not changed. After the Lehman crash, most governments were talking about strengthening financial regulations and regulatory agencies, and possibly establishing an international regulatory body. The developments in the past year have actually made financial supervision worse. To support financial institutions, the U.S. government suspended mark-to-market accounting rules for assets on the books of financial institutions, which has allowed them to report profits.
Revamping the financial system has been reduced to political moves over regulating banker salaries. If this could be done, incentives for financial institutions to manufacture bubbles would be removed. But it can't be done. Financial professionals can be based anywhere in the world, and there will always be some countries willing to host them. Because of such competitive concerns, a global consensus on regulating pay for financial professionals is unlikely.
I think the ultimate objective for financial reforms is to make leverage transparent. There are many reasons that a bubble forms. Debt leverage, however, is always at the center of a property bubble -- the most damaging kind. Leverage within a financial system's assets-to-equity capital ratio is a driving force for an asset bubble. Complex accounting rules and varying treatment of different financial institutions make it difficult to measure leverage. The international standard for a bank's capital is 8 percent, which allows 12 times leverage. How off-balance sheet assets are treated can make a huge difference. A lot of big banks had 30 times leverage at the beginning of the crisis due to off-balance assets.
Other institutions such as finance companies are harder to regulate. Some industrial companies such as General Electric and General Motors took advantage of loopholes and created finance companies that are essentially banks. Hedge funds, mutual funds, private equity firms, etc., are even more lightly regulated. When they purchase securitized debt securities and engage in lending, they are like banks.
One interesting phenomenon is how money market funds wreaked havoc after Lehman crashed. These funds are supposed to be ultra safe for buying triple-A, short-term, liquid debt instruments. The problem was their demand for liquidity. Self-manufactured liquidity provided a false sense of security despite the risks of underlying securities, such as short-term paper issued by investment banks. When that false sense of security was jolted by the Lehman collapse, all rushed to exit at the same time. Without government support, they wouldn't have been able to get their money back.
The problem with financial regulation is not the banking system per se, but the shadow banking system. It provides leverage with much less capital than the banking system. When leverage in the economy is rising, asset prices rise, too. Rising asset prices boost collateral value and, hence, more borrowing. A surge in earnings among financial institutions usually accompanies such a spiral of rising leverage and rising asset prices.
It is extremely difficult for an established regulatory regime to stop such a spiral. Usually new financial institutions or products come on the scene, and then a new leverage game begins. It would be impossible for an existing regime to be comprehensive enough to anticipate future institutions and products. Governments may need to install principle-based, not just rule-based, regulatory agencies that could take action to control new financial creations.
The U.S. government is proposing a consumer protection agency for financial products. Such an agency could at least respond to new financial products sold to consumers and, therefore, could be an effective mechanism for stopping some future bubbles. The proposal has met vehement opposition from the financial industry. It may not get through.
What can we speak for after spending trillions of dollars? Not much. Few major players went to jail. The U.S. government sent many more to prison in the 1980s after the junk bond bubble burst. This bubble is 10 times bigger. Yet, apart from the most obvious criminals such as Bernie Madoff and Allen Stanford, who ran multibillion-dollar Ponzi schemes, none of the big shots have landed behind bars. Indeed, a lot of the big shots who brought down the world are still out there running things. The lesson from the Lehman collapse seems to be, "Take whatever you can and, when it crashes, you get to keep it." How governments and central banks have dealt with this bubble will encourage more people to join bubble making in the future.
Since governments have failed to take advantage of the crisis and build a better financial system, it will become very difficult to push it forward now. The sense of urgency is gone. One may argue that, since markets are stable now, there is no need for radical reforms. This is exactly the wrong conclusion. Trillions of dollars have been spent to buy today's stability. If the money isn't spent in vain, serious reforms should take place to decrease the possibility of a catastrophe like this in the future.
The big change that happened is a rapid increase in the U.S. household savings rate. It happened much more quickly than I expected and has the potential to change the global economy. The economic explanation is negative wealth effect. U.S. household net wealth declined 20 percent, or nearly 100 percent of GDP. The rule of the thumb is that it would lead to a 5 percent reduction in spending. The U.S. household savings rate has increased more than that -- and continues to rise. It could rise above 10 percent next year. Because of rising savings, the U.S. trade deficit has already halved from the peak. It could halve again next year. This is why I have turned positive on the dollar.
Financial markets are still maximum bearish on the dollar. Liquidity is being channeled out of dollar into all other assets. This is why there is such a high correlation between the dollar and other assets. I think this is the most crowded trade in the world. When the dollar reverses, the short squeeze could cause a global crisis.
Because no meaningful financial reforms have occurred, bubble-making rapidly came back in fashion. The drivers are faith in an ever-depreciating dollar and, later, inflation. Stocks, commodities, and even property values in some cities have skyrocketed this year. It is happening amid a synchronous global recession.
Of course, bulls would argue the market recovery is forecasting a strong global economy ahead. I seriously doubt it. With savings and unemployment rising, the OECD bloc is unlikely to stage a strong recovery from the recession. This view is not the market's consensus, which assumes all stimuli will lead to a strong and sustained recovery. As I have argued before, supply and demand become misaligned during a big bubble. When it bursts, the economy must restructure supply and demand before the economy can be fully employed. Government stimulus can't solve the problem. Realignment will take time.
Because policymakers mistakenly think stimulus spending can bring back growth, they are pushing too hard. The eventual consequences are inflation and bubbles along the way. These bubbles will be short-lived. The current boom market is a good example. At the beginning of the year, I predicted such a bubble from March to September. I still hold to this belief. China's stock market peaked in August and the U.S. market is peaking in September. The reason for the shortness of the bubble is its limited impact on real demand.
How long a bubble lasts depends on the size of its multiplier effect on the economy. A large multiplier effect leads to an economic boom that boosts asset returns. Market watchers can make a plausible case that high asset prices reflect a revaluation rather than a bubble. Strong fundamentals and rising asset prices could sustain each other for a period. The dotcom bubble began in 1996 and lasted five years. The global property bubble began in 2002 and lasted five years, too.
A technology bubble can be extended by cutting costs and boosting profits. A property bubble stimulates demand in many parts of demand and can boost corporate earnings, benefiting financial institutions, retailers, construction companies and material suppliers. This large multiplier effect is why a property bubble usually lasts many years.
Only a multiplier effect from the current bubble is stopping financial institutions from going under. However, weighed down by trillions of dollars in non-performing assets, they cannot lend with abandon again, which makes it impossible to revive property bubbles. Besides, American households won't join the "borrow-and-spend" game again. Essentially, the main short-term impact of the current bubble is preventing the financial system from collapsing. It won't lead to substantial demand creation.
Many investors today think a bubble is inevitable and, when it bursts, another can be created quickly to keep on going with life as usual. What has occurred over the past six months seems to validate this viewpoint. History, however, is not kind to this view. Serial bubble making leads to a bigger economic crisis later. What occurred in the United States in the 1930s and Japan over the past two decades are good examples in that regard. If a new bubble were always available for bailouts, we'd have the ultimate free lunch. But there is no free lunch.
Our serial bubble making began 10 years ago with the Asian Financial Crisis. It led to loose monetary policy in developed economies, especially in the United States, and undervalued exchange rates in developing economies. The inflationary force from this loose monetary policy was kept down by excess capacity or capacity creation in developing economies. The environment for tolerating such a loose monetary environment ends when inflation surges in emerging economies first and developed economies second.
When inflation becomes a political problem and policymakers are forced to respond, money supplies will be cut. After that, no more bubbles.
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Saturday, September 19, 2009
I watched Andy Xie being interviewed this morning on CCTV and dug out this recent article.
An asset bubble is forming in Spore right now - property. I doubt the PAP gahment has as much foresight as Xie.
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Andy Xie: What We Can Learn as Japan's Economy Sinks
09-16
Japan hasn't sustained growth bounces for decades, nor will it under the DPJ government. Therein lie lessons for other economies.
(Caijing Magazine) Japan has had a political earthquake. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) that ruled Japan since the end of the World War II lost most of its seats in the latest election, while the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won 308 of 480 lower house seats, complementing its majority in the upper house.
Now, DPJ is in a strong position to undertake structural reforms. Indeed, a big political change brings hope in any country that's stagnated for as long as Japan. However, DPJ is unlikely to turn around Japan's economy anytime soon. LDP, in the name of Keynesian stimulus, spent all its money over the past decade on wasteful investments, leaving DPJ with no resources for reform. I'm afraid DPJ has an impossible situation on its hands.
Anyone who doesn't believe in the harm of a financial bubble but does believe in Keynesian stimulus magic should visit Japan. A likely dip for the Anglo-Saxon economies next year will underscore these truths. The same goes for anyone who thinks China's latest real estate bubble, asset borrowing and shadow banking system are worthwhile substitutes for real economic growth.
The world including China can learn a lot by looking at what's happened to Japan, and what's in store for DPJ. Since Japan's stock market bubble burst in 1989 and the land market popped in 1992, the LDP government has run up debt equal to nearly 200 percent GDP in hopes of reviving the economy. And its economy has stagnated.
The burst of the global credit bubble in 2008 brought down Japan's export machine. That was its only hope. Now, of all OECD economies, Japan's looks most like a depression. Its nominal GDP declined 8 percent in the first quarter 2009 from the year before. Although its economy rebounded a bit in the second quarter, nominal GDP for 2009 is still expected to decline substantially and will likely be lower than in 1993.
Many analysts blame Japan's problems on corporate inefficiency. This is partly true. Japan has had a hyper-competitive export sector. Domestic, demand-oriented industries are inefficient due to labor market practices. More importantly, sectors that became massively levered during the bubble years have been walking like zombies for two decades, weighing down the economy's overall efficiency. Japan's inefficiencies are largely a consequence of its decision to prop these industries.
U.S. return on asset (ROA) was twice as high as that in Japan. But, in hindsight, higher ROA in the United States was mostly a bubble phenomenon. Much of U.S. corporate profitability was due to financial engineering. In one aspect, the export performance of Japan's corporate sector has done very well -- much better than its U.S. counterpart. Japan's exports doubled in yen terms between 1993 and 2008, and the sector's share of GDP nearly doubled to 16 percent from 9 percent, even though the yen remained strong during the period. The performance of Japan's export sector shows its inefficiencies elsewhere were largely due to shortcomings in the system.
Japan's stagnation has been linked to government handling of debt overhang in the corporate sector -- mainly in the real estate, construction, and retail sectors, and left over from the bubble era. In the 1980s, especially after the Plaza Accord, Japan's corporate sector accumulated a massive amount of debt for financial speculation. Total corporate debt more than doubled to about 900 trillion yen, or 200 percent of GDP, from 1984-'92. After land and stock prices collapsed, the net value of the corporate sector's financial assets switched from about 30 percent of GDP to a minus 50 percent of GDP. If the change in land holding value is included, the corporate sector's net worth may have fallen by 200 percent of GDP. As corporate profits are about 10 percent of GDP in a developed economy, Japan's corporate sector would need two decades to earn its way back.
The Japanese government did choose to let the corporate sector earn its way back, first by preventing bankruptcies and second by stimulating demand. To achieve the first goal, the government kept interest rates near zero and Japanese banks did not pursue mark-to-market accounting in assessing borrower solvency. With a big chunk of the corporate sector zombie-like, the economy, of course, was always facing downward pressure. The government had to run large fiscal deficits to prop up the economy. After the bubble, Japan's economic equilibrium stagnated and the fiscal deficit swelled.
This strategy was flawed in three aspects. First, even as the corporate sector earns profits to pay down debt, the government's debt is rising. At best, it is shifting corporate debt to government debt. In reality, government debt has been rising faster than private sector debt has been falling.
Second, economic efficiencies don't increase in such equilibrium. Existing resources in the zombie sector are essentially unproductive. Bankruptcies improve efficiency by shifting resources from failing to succeeding companies. When rules are changed to stop bankruptcies, efficiency is sacrificed. Worse, incremental resources are sucked up to pay fiscal deficits used to prop up zombie industries. Japan is thus trapped in equilibrium of low productivity.
Third, a long period of stagnation could worsen irreversible social change. A falling birth rate, for example, is one consequence that is wreaking havoc on the Japanese economy. Japan's post-bubble policy was to let property prices decline gradually. Hence, living costs also declined gradually. On the other hand, the economy stopped growing, which caused income expectations to quickly adjust downward. The combination of high property prices and low income growth rapidly pushed down Japan's birth rate. As a consequence, Japan's population is declining two decades after the bubble. The rising burden of caring for the old will lower Japan's ability to pay for anything else.
After two decades, Japan hasn't achieved its main policy goal by letting its corporate sector work down debt. Total, non-financial corporate debt is about the same as it was two decades ago. At 180 percent of GDP, Japan's corporate indebtedness remains one of the highest in the world. Japan's household sector has indeed de-levered. Its debt at 69 percent of GDP is one of the lowest among developed economies. But government debt has increased massively over the past two decades. Its current debt level at 194 percent is the highest in the world. Only super-low interest rates are hiding the debt burden.
DPJ has been handed a poisoned chalice. It won't have the resources needed for a serious restructuring of the economy. Its twin goals are to increase support for the household sector and shift decision-making power to politicians from bureaucrats. The government's debt burden makes it impossible for any meaningful increase in supporting the household sector. LDP wasted all the money. DPJ has no room to finance either new social programs or economic restructuring. To show progress, DPJ is likely to stage a high-profile confrontation with the bureaucracy – a step that may be good for politics but won't do much to improve the economy.
Total indebtedness of Japan's non-financial sector is 443 percent -- probably the highest in the world, and far higher than the 240 percent in the United States. A difference is that the United States owes a big chunk of its debt to foreigners, while all of Japan's is carried by its own citizens.
Most analysts think high government debt is bearable as long as a country has enough domestic savings to fund it – a situation Japan has enjoyed. But the future may be different. Japan's declining labor force is decreasing its export ability. At some point, it may begin to run trade and current account deficits. When that happens, Japan's interest rate may rise substantially, which would cause a fiscal crisis. Such a crisis may occur under the DPJ's rule. It could be blamed for a crisis that LDP had been building for two decades.
We can learn much from Japan's experience. The global economy -- mainly the Anglo-Saxon economy -- is facing the consequences of a massive credit bubble. The remedies most governments have embraced are to keep interest rates low and fiscal deficits high. These are the same policies Japan pursued after its bubble burst nearly two decades ago. How today's bubble economies are treating bankruptcies and bad debt is shockingly similar to what was seen in Japan. The United States and others have suspended mark-to-market accounting rules to let banks stay afloat despite large amounts of toxic assets. It's the same "let them earn their way back" strategy that Japan pursued. The strategy fails to work because it keeps an economy weak, limiting the earning power of financial institutions.
As the global economy is again showing signs of growth in the third quarter, most governments are celebrating the effectiveness of their policies. Yet Japan's experience forces us to pause: Its economy experienced many such growth bounces over the past two decades, but was unable to sustain any of them. The problem was Japan only used stimulus, not restructuring, to cope with the bursting of its bubble. After the demise of any big bubble, serious structural problems that hamper economic growth remain. Stimulus can only provide short-term support that makes structural reform possible. When policymakers celebrate the short-term impact of stimulus and forget structural reforms, economies slump again. I think the Anglo-Saxon economies will dip again next year.
China can learn a lot from Japan's experience as well. Its bubble formed when companies began focusing on financial investments rather than core business. In the 1980s, Japan's corporate sector tapped the corporate bond market and raised massive amounts of capital for asset purchases.
Recently, Chinese enterprises borrowed money and pumped it into asset markets. They essentially provided leverage for asset markets. When leverage was rising, asset inflation occurred, letting companies book profits that were many times greater than operating profits from core businesses. That gave them greater incentive to pursue asset appreciation rather than operating profitability. The corporate sector became a shadow banking system for financing asset speculation.
Thus, China's corporate sector is now behaving in a way similar to what was seen in Japan two decades ago. China's businesses increasingly focus on asset investment rather than core business. When an asset bubble boosts corporate profits, it seems benign at first. Nobody sees the harm. However, when businesses earn profits from the investments in each other rather than their corporate businesses, their operating profitability deteriorates because they don't invest in their core businesses anymore. Accounting profitability is just a bubble.
As I traveled across China recently, it was rare to hear about a business whose officials are enthusiastic about their core business. But everyone seems excited about financial activities. The lending boom in the first half of 2009 seems to have been channeled mostly into asset markets by the corporate sector.
In particular, property seems to have become a main profit source for most big businesses. China's corporate borrowing one way or another goes into the land market. And property development has become the most important source of profit for China's corporate sector. If a manufacturing business is buoyant, odds are it is profiting from property development. The banking sector reports high profitability due to direct or indirect loans for property development. Property development profit is actually from land appreciation. If property development profitability is measured according to land price at sale time, the development itself would not be profitable.
A bubble rises when there is excess money supply. Is the current, excessive monetary growth due to demand or supply? We can argue that point forever. When the former chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, said a central bank couldn't stop a bubble, he meant money demand would rise regardless of interest rates. I disagree. If a central bank targets monetary growth in line with nominal GDP growth, a big bubble can't happen. Aside from central bank failure, then, the most important microeconomic element in a bubble is the shadow banking system.
Regulators limit what banks can do by imposing capital requirements. The international standard is 8 percent of total assets, but banks can use accounting tricks to minimize their requirements. But a big accounting loophole can lead to disaster. For example, the loose restrictions on off-balance holdings were major factors in the global credit bubble. Most regulators are now tightening accounting rules for capital requirements.
Shadow banking is a less noticed but more important factor in creating bubbles. Most analysts compare it to the hedge fund industry, which provided leverage for financial speculators with little capital. The shadow banking system is much more because industrial firms engaging in financial activities are more important. Entities such as GE Capital and GMAC provided massive leverage to asset markets with little capital. A shadow banking system is essential to a big bubble.
China's corporate sector increasingly looks like a shadow banking system. It raises funds from banks, through commercial bills or the corporate bond market, and then channels the funds into the land market. The resulting land inflation underwrites corporate profitability and improves their creditworthiness in the short term.
The same thing happened in Japan.
To control China's expanding real estate bubble, the country's regulators must limit monetary growth to nominal GDP growth. Faster monetary growth accommodates and supports the bubble. To understand consequences of ignoring this reality, we need only look at Japan today.
An asset bubble is forming in Spore right now - property. I doubt the PAP gahment has as much foresight as Xie.
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Thursday, August 06, 2009
The real S'pore Pledge under the PAP
The truth always hurts...
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We, the citizens of SingaporeHowever to feel less bitter, just lap up all the 155th media and newspapers for this weekend hahaha.
pledge ourselves to serve the foreign people,
regardless of their backwardness, race, language or religion,
to build a foreigner-dominated society,
leveraging on 66.6% Singaporean stupidity,
so as to achieve happiness, prosperity and
progress for the famiLee, their cronies and their foreign fake talents.
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